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The agriculture in transition countries can be described by considerable uncertainties. 
In these countries public institutions are ineffective in ensuring contract enforcement. 
The absence of enforceable contract to set up any kind of vertical co-ordination has 
become difficult. In addition, this creates severe barriers for price discovery involving 
high transaction costs to co-ordinate market exchanges. Although there is a wealth of 
literature on marketing cooperative, but research on their role in transition agriculture 
is scarce. This paper tries to contribute to this gap. In this paper we have analysed the 
potential benefits and costs of the marketing cooperatives in Hungary employing 
transaction cost economics framework. The results presented add to a small literature 
on the marketing cooperatives in transition agriculture. We found that the quantity, 
the existence of contract, flexibility and trust are the most important factor for farmers 
to selling their product via cooperative. The cluster analysis provides some additional 
insights regarding farmers’ choices. Namely, direct benefits including price, input 
finance extension services and speed of payments from cooperative membership have 
also important role. The most striking result is that the diversification and reputation 
has positive influences on the share of cooperative. Furthermore, large farmers have 
less willingness to sell their product to the cooperative. Surprisingly, asset specificity 
has rather negative effects on the share of cooperative.  
 The Choice of Marketing Cooperative in a Transition Agriculture 
 
1. Introduction 
The agriculture in transition countries can be described by considerable uncertainties. In these 
countries public institutions are ineffective in ensuring contract enforcement. The absence of 
enforceable contract to set up any kind of vertical co-ordination has become difficult. In 
addition, this creates severe barriers for price discovery involving high transaction costs to co-
ordinate market exchanges. In those sub-sectors, where any type of production contracts does 
exist, agricultural producers face the hold-up problems (e.g. delayed payment for delivered 
products or ex post price reduction by retailers). These phenomena are reinforced by the 
emergence of modern retailing sector leading to serious problems for subsectors dominated by 
fragmented and small-scale farms, like the horticultural sector is. Recently there is growing 
literature focusing on various governance structures of agriculture in transition countries 
employing different frameworks (e.g. Rudolph, 1999, Gow et al., 2000, Zaharieva et al. 2002, 
Fertő and Szabó, 2002, Dries and Swinnen, 2004, Gorton et al. 2006). Furthermore other 
papers concentrate on the role of contract in transition agriculture (Boger 2001; Boger and 
Beckmann 2004, Bárdos and Fertő 2006, Fertő 2006, Szabó and Bárdos, 2006). Although 
there is a wealth of literature on marketing cooperative, but research on their role in transition 
agriculture is scarce (Fertő and Szabó 2004). This paper tries to contribute to this gap. 
Marketing cooperatives may solve many problems of vertical coordination, however the 
numbers of cooperatives are still limited in Hungary. In the study, we examine the Mórakert 
Purchasing and Service Co-operative, in Mórahalom, county Csongrád, which is located in 
the southern east part of Hungary. It works as a successful co-operative in terms of increasing 
annual turnover and membership thus being a good example for solving various coordination 
issues in Hungarian horticultural sector within an evolving supply chain. The aim of the paper   2
is to identify the cost and benefits of co-operative membership and their explanatory factors 
using a small-scale survey among co-op members. The remainder of the study is organised as 
follows. The section 2 describes the survey design and the variables. The results are presented 
in section 3. The last section summarises and offers some conclusions on the implications for 
the market mechanisms of Hungary’s horticultural sector. 
 
2. Survey design  
 
We also investigate why the members of co-operative sell their products via Mórakert Co-
operative. The questionnaire was prepared in consultation with management of Mórakert Co-
operative. The total number of observations is 44. Table 1 and Table 2 present descriptive 
statistics that identify the average cooperative members’ profile and the production structure, 
respectively. In order to facilitate the comparison across the different variables, instead of 
standard deviation we computed coefficient of variation.  
 
Table 1:  Cooperative member profile 
Indicators  Mean  Coefficient of variation  Min.  Max. 
Total land  (ha)  25.10  2.43  0.25  350 
Land rented (ha)  27.78  1.71  0.5  150 
Full time family labour (person)  2.55  0.50  0  7 
Paid labour (person)  6.9  1.37  0  45 
Age (years)  48.38  0.17  30  65 
Education (1 lowest, 9 highest)  3.79  0.36  1  9 
 
The average cooperative member’s farm size is 25 hectares of land, whilst 31% of them rent 
extra land too. The coefficient of variation (2.43) and the maximum and minimum values 
corresponding to the total land used emphasise the homogeneity of the producers. The second   3
line of Table 1 shows that the group of producers using extra land is slightly more 
homogeneous and they rent bigger plots, (27 hectares on average, with 1.71 coefficient of 
variation). 88% of members use family labour, whilst 48% employ paid labour (7 people on 
average) as well. In line with the farm size indicators discussed above, the coefficient of 
variation of paid labour is also rather high, (larger farms employing more paid labour, 
maximum 45 people). Turning to the average age, (48 on average, youngest member is 30, 
oldest 65) the group is more homogeneous with a low coefficient of variation 
 
Table 2:  Production structure and the link with the cooperative 
Indicators Mean  Coeff.  of 
variation 
Min. Max. 
Vegetable varieties produced  3.24  0.68  1  10 
Share of vegetable production sold 
through Co-op (%) 
68.44 0.45  3  100 
Fruit varieties produced  1.84  0.72  1  5 
Share of fruit production sold through 
Co-op (%) 
70.38 0.45  5  100 
Share of potato production sold through 
Co-op (%) 
73.05 0.44  0  100 
Co-op Membership (years)  4.17  0.68  1  16 
 
The lower coefficient of variation indicators in Table 2 suggests that the production structure 
and the importance of cooperative for the members are more homogenous than the average 
member’s profile. 84% of those interviewed produce vegetables (on average 3 varieties), 
whilst 28% produce fruits (on average 2 varieties). The largest share of production is sold 
through the cooperative (73% of potatoes, 70% of fruits and 68% of vegetables), with a low 
variation across members. Finally, the newest cooperative members joined a year ago, whilst   4




Empirical analysis is conducted in the two stages. First, we focus on the importance of 
various factors in the choice of co-operative employing multivariate statistical analysis. 
Second, we investigate the share of co-operative in the selling of various products applying 
transaction costs economics framework.  
 
Reasons for choice of co-operative 
The respondents sold 59 per cent of vegetables, 21 per cent of fruits and 33 of potatoes via 
Mórakert co-operative. Thirty four per cent of farmers sold their output to only co-operative, 
fifty per cent sold to between two and six buyers, remainder sold to more than ten buyers. The 
majority of respondents are individual farms or family farms (91 per cent), remainders are 
partnerships and co-operatives. Thirty four per cent of farmers sell only one product and thirty 
nine per cent sell at least five products. Thirty three per cent of individual and family farms 
sell only one product. 
 
The theme concerned with potential benefits of co-operative membership employed a 13-item 
scale that measured the importance of these features in a co-operative choice context (1 = not 
at all important, 7 = very important). Figure 1 shows the importance in descending orders 
attached by producers to various marketing factors for sales through the co-operative. The 
most important factors are for selling via co-operative quantity, existence of contract, 
flexibility and trust. Interestingly, habit and co-operative deals with delivery price premium   5
and bargaining power issue are unimportant factors. Furthermore, services (input finance, 
extensions services) providing by co-operative are also not too important factors for farmers.  
 
























The factors were further analysed to explore underlying dimension of the producers’ 
perception of benefit from the membership in co-operative. The original variables consisted of 
13-item seven-point scale concerned with the importance of factors for the choice of co-
operative. However, the communalities for the attributes concerned with “Co-operative deals 
with delivery” and “Price premium” and “No other option” were judged to be too low (< 
0.50) indicating that the set of derived factors explained a low proportion of the variance of 
those attributes. Consequently the three attributes were excluded from the subsequent 
analysis. The final solution was derived on the basis of varimax rotation and the extraction 
criterion was to derive factors with eigenvalues greater than unity which generated a solution 
in two factors. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkim measure of sampling adequacy is 0.735, indicating 
that data matrix has sufficient correlation to justify the application of factor analysis.   6
Bartlett’s test of sphericity accounts for the significance of the correlation matrix. In our case 
it is large and statistically significant at the one per cent level, so that hypothesis that analysed 
matrix is the identity matrix can be rejected. Consequently, the factor analysis is meaningful.  
 
The two-factor solution explains 81.8 per cent of the total variance in the data set, which is 
satisfactory. The cut-off for interpretation purposes is factor loadings greater or equal to 0.5 
on at least one factor. The first factor is most strongly correlated with the variables ”trust”, 
”quantity”, ”payment speed”, ”price”, ”existence of contract” and ”flexibility” (Table 3). The 
second factor is associated with „”habit”, ”input finance”, ”services” and ”personal contact”.  
 
Table 3: Rotated factor matrix solution: reasons for selling via co-operative  
 factor1  factor2  communality 
Habit -0.021 0.663 0.540
Trust  0.751 0.204 0.605
Quantity   0.577 0.170 0.662
Payment speed  0.670 -0.080 0.555
Price   0.775 0.018 0.600
Input finance   0.171 0.706 0.527
Services 0.208 0.718 0.559
Personal contact  0.473 0.531 0.709
Existence of contract   0.595 0.493 0.596
Flexibility   0.583 0.376 0.681
Variance (per cent)  0.466 0.353  
Cummulative variance (per cent)  0.466 0.818  
Eigenvalue   4.082 1.450  
 
Cluster analysis was applied as a two-stage process. In the first stage, a hierarchical analysis 
was employed to provide an indication of the appropriate number of clusters. Hair et al. 
(1998, p. 479) suggests a procedure based upon inspection of the distance information from   7
the agglomeration schedule. Following this procedure the appropriate number of clusters is 
suggested at the stage where there is a ”large”’ increase in the distance measure, indicating 
that a further merger would result in decrease in homogeneity. However Hair et al. point out 
that ”the selection of the final cluster solution requires substantial researcher judgement and is 
considered by many to be too subjective”’. This procedure suggested either a five-cluster 
solution or a three-cluster solution. Consideration of relative cluster size and the desire for 
parsimony led to the choice of a three-cluster solution. Subsequently, in the second stage, the 
K-Means optimisation method was employed to derive a solution with the specified number 
of clusters. Consequently the producers respondents are grouped into three clusters, 
respectively comprising approximately 36 per cent (cluster 1) 34 per cent (cluster 2) and 30 
per cent (cluster 3) of the producers sample. 
 
Table 4:  Cluster analysis: reasons for selling via co-operative 
  Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  mean 
Habit  3.44 1.60 2.15 2.43 
Trust  5.56 4.87 5.15 5.20 
Quantity    5.13 4.93 6.15 5.36 
Payment  speed  3.81 2.47 3.92 3.39 
Price    4.25 3.47 3.69 3.82 
Input finance   4.69  2.60  2.77  3.41 
Services  5.06 3.67 4.85 4.52 
Personal  contact 5.38 3.93 4.62 4.66 
Existence of contract   6.00  4.67  5.38  5.36 
Flexibility    5.81 4.60 5.46 5.30 
N  16 15 13  
 
The main characteristics of three clusters can be identified as follows (table 4). Cluster 1 place 
more importance on trust, personal contact, the existence of contract, and the direct benefits   8
from co-operative membership including price, input finance and extension services. On the 
other hand, cluster 2 places less emphasis on direct or indirect benefits from the co-operative, 
group means are below average for all reason of selling through co-operative. Cluster 3 places 
more importance on quantity selling via co-operative and speed of payments. Otherwise 
cluster 1 and 3 place above average emphasis on services, the contract and flexibility.  
 
Table 5: Classifications of farms by clusters and the share of coop in the selling of products 
  Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Total 
vegetable  75.0 57.9 40.8 59,0 
fruit  16.9 24.0 21.5 20,7 
potato  28.1 39.0 32.3 33,1 
 
Cluster 1 incorporate farms that sell 75 per cent of their vegetable and below average share of 
fruit and potato through the co-operative (table 5). Cluster 2 consists of producers that sell 
their fruit and potato above average level. Cluster 3 encompasses farms that sell their fruit and 
potato at the average level. 
 
Table 6: Classifications of farms by clusters and characteristics of farms 
  C luster1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Total 
hired  labour  2.0 6.0 1.7 3.2 
area 28.3  9.2  40.9  25.5 
membership  3.2 4.1 4.6 3.9 
age  47.3 46.8 46.8 47 
partners 4.3  10.7 2.1  5.8 
 
Cluster 1 comprises farms that employ 2 hired labour and use 28 hectare with 3 years co-
operative membership and sell their product 4 partners in average (table 6). Cluster 2 contains 
farms with above average hired labour, but below average area and more than 10 buying   9
partners. Cluster 3 encompasses farms that have less hired labour but use more than 40 
hectare land and sell product to only two partners. 
 
The share of co-operative 
In this section we test the propositions of transaction cost economics in relating to the share of 
co-operative in selling of members’ product. Transaction costs economics (TCE) claims that 
firm’s vertical boundaries decisions are determined by characteristics associated with 
efficiency of the chosen form of organisation. It is assumed that efficiency is inversely related 
to the extent of the costs of organising the exchange. These include the costs of negotiating 
and written contracts and the costs of monitoring and enforcing contractual performance 
(Williamson, 1985). The theory focuses on identifying the characteristics of transactions that 
are best suited to market and firm organisation. TCE asserts that all contracts are incomplete 
and subject to renegotiations and the possibility of opportunistic behaviour due to the 
presence of bounded rationality of agents, the asymmetric information and inability to 
completely specify behaviour in the existence of multiply contingencies. Thus, the problem of 
opportunistic behaviour is more severe when an exchange requires one or both parties to 
make considerable transaction specific investments, since such investments create quasi-rent 
that may be subject to hold up. The one of main advantage of co-operative is to decrease the 
transaction costs of farmers searching and establishing partners long run.  
 
In this paper we focus on the following specific hypotheses.  
H1: Asset specificity. The share of co-operative in selling product increases with the value of 
relationship-specific investments.   10
H2: Complexity. Product complexity and product diversification make searching and 
establishing new partners lengthy, leaky and expensive. Thus, the share of co-operative will 
increase with number of partners. 
H3: Reputation. We expect that reputation has positive effect on the share of co-operative in 
selling of product. 
H4: Size. The larger farms have more bargaining power, thus the size of firms will be 
negatively associated with the share of co-operative. 
Therefore, the theoretical model we test is: 
Prob(Share of co-operative)=f(Asset specificity, Complexity, Reputation, Size). 
The expected signs of the variables are as follows: 
f1>0, f2>0, f3>0, and f4<0.  
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in our model is SHARE, ranging between 0 and 
100 per cent.  
Explanatory variables. 
Physical asset specificity. Horticultural production’s physical asset specificity is captured by 
two variables: 1) area of plastic tunnel (PLASTIC); 2) irrigated area (IRRIGATED).  
Human asset specificity measure as: 1) age of farmers (AGE), and 2) farmers’ final level of 
education (EDUC).  
Complexity and diversification. Production diversity is measured number of products in 
horticultural production (DIVER). 
The size of firm. The size of the operation is measured by two variables: the number of hired 
labour (LAB) and total area in hectare (AREA).  
Reputation. It is difficult to quantify reputation in a postal questionnaire; we used two proxies 
for measuring reputation. We asked about the reasons for selling product via co-operative. 
The respondents evaluated the importance of specific factors, including trust (TRUST) and   11
personal contact (PCONT) on a seven points-scale. We estimate our model for each product 
groups separately. We report only best results in terms of our a priori expectations and 
statistical significance.  
 
The estimated coefficients of tobit model for vegetables are presented in Table 7. The 
estimations indicate that asset specificity variables have unexpected sign, and are significant. 
The reputation variable (PCONT) is significant with expected signs. It indicates that the 
growing reputation leads to larger share of co-operative in selling of products. The complexity 
variable (DIV) has expected signs with significance. This suggests that farmers producing 
more products sell more via co-operative. Finally, the coefficient of AREA is significant with 
expected signs implicating that larger farms sell less their product through co-operative. 
 
Table 7:  Tobit results for the share of co-operative in the total vegetable sales 





AREA   -0.836*** 
constant 66.738** 
Pseudo R
2   0.1460 
N 42 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
The model of fruit yields less promising results (table 8). The estimations indicate that asset 
specificity variables have the expected signs, and but human specificity variable is only 
significant. This means that farmers investing more in physical asset specificity try save their 
investment with selling through the co-operative. TRUST variable has unexpected sign   12
without significance. The complexity variable (DIV) is significant with expected sign and 
AREA is not significant with unexpected sign. This suggest again that farmers with wider 
product assortments sell more via co-operative. 
 
Table 8:  Tobit results for the share of co-operative in the total fruit sales 








2   0.1524 
N 42 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
Table 9:  Tobit results for the share of co-operative in the total potato sales 








2   0.1202 
N 42 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
Estimations for potato sales are presented in Table 9. The asset specificity variables have 
unexpected signs and it is significant for only physical asset specificity. We find that   13
complexity is positively related to the share of co-operative, but it is not significant. The 
reputation (TRUST) and size (LAB) variable are significant with expected signs. It indicates 
that the trust yields a larger share of co-operative in selling of products. Furthermore, largest 
farms have less incentive to sell their potatoes to the co-operative. 
 
In sum, tobit estimation produces mixed results. The hypothesis on the positive relationship 
between asset specificity and the share of co-operative is not confirmed. Our results provide 
more support to the positive link between diversification and the share of co-operative. 
Similarly, estimations show the positive role of reputation in selling product via co-operative. 




In this paper we have analysed the potential benefits and costs of the marketing cooperatives 
in Hungary employing transaction cost economics framework. The results presented add to a 
small literature on the marketing cooperatives in transition agriculture. We found that the 
quantity, the existence of contract, flexibility and trust are the most important factor for 
farmers to selling their product via cooperative. The cluster analysis provides some additional 
insights regarding farmers’ choices. Namely, direct benefits including price, input finance 
extension services and speed of payments from cooperative membership have also important 
role. The most striking result is that the diversification and reputation has positive influences 
on the share of cooperative. Furthermore, large farmers have less willingness to sell their 
product to the cooperative. Surprisingly, asset specificity has rather negative effects on the 
share of cooperative.  
   14
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